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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal from
the Second Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee, Woods Cross City (hereinafter "the City"), is
dissatisfied with the statement of issues presented by Appellant,
Craig Kirk (hereinafter "Kirk"), and submits the following
statement of issues as permitted under Utah R. App. P. 24(b).
Appellant's Statement of the Issues of Fact (a) through (c) are
improper in that they presume the trial court referred
specifically to property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross, Utah.

In actuality, the trial court merely referred to

property located "on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400
West . . . ."

(Judgment at f 1 (March 24, 1993)).

I.

Was the trial court correct in determining that there
are no issues of material fact present in this case
which would preclude summary judgment in the City's
favor ?

II.

Was the trial court correct in determining that the
undisputed facts entitle the City to judgment as a
matter of law under Section 12-10-102 of the Woods
Cross City Ordinances and Section 10-9-1002 of the Utah
Code Annotated ?

III. Was the trial court correct in dismissing Kirk's
Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses ?
IV.

Do the new issues presented for the first time on
appeal justify overturning the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in the City's favor ?

V.

Should the City be awarded damages, costs and attorneys
fees under Utah R. App. P. 33 on the ground that Kirk's
appeal is frivolous and pursued solely for the purpose
of delay ?

wc-kirk.brf
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the
Court shall view the facts in a light most favorable to the
losing party and shall review the trial court's conclusions of
law for correctness.

Blue Cross & Blue Shields v. State of Utah,

779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes and rules that are pertinent to the resolution
of the issues presented on appeal are set forth verbatim in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This is an action by Woods Cross

seeking a permanent injunction against Craig Kirk enjoining the
use of his property located within the City for commercial and/or
industrial purposes in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning
ordinances.

Kirk is appealing the trial court's grant of summary

judgment in the City's favor.
Course of Proceedings.

Except as provided herein and as

otherwise provided or supplemented in the City's Statement of
Facts set forth belowf the City agrees with Kirk's Statement of
the Course of Proceedings and will not duplicate such effort as
permitted under Utah R. App. P. 24(b).

The City disagrees with

Kirk's Statement No. 2 in that the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed on December 2, 1992, not November 2, 1992, and
wc-lcirk.brf
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Statement No. 5 in that the City's Notice to Submit for Decision
was filed on December 21, 1992, not December 2, 1992. The City
further objects to Kirk's Statements No. 8 & 9 in that the trial
court did entertain and rule on Kirk's Motion to Dismiss, Motions
to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Stay Proceedings, as evidenced
in the Judgment dated March 24, 1993.
Disposition in Circuit Court.

The Circuit Court, Honorable

S. Mark Johnson presiding, granted Woods Cross' Motion for
Summary Judgment permanently enjoining Kirk from using his
property located at approximately 1450 West 500 South for parking
and storing large commercial vehicles and equipment in violation
of the Woods Cross zoning ordinances.
Statement of Facts.

Construing Woods Cross City's Complaint

in a light most favorable to Kirk and indulging all reasonable
inferences in Kirk's favor, the following facts appear of record:
1.

Appellee, Woods Cross City, is a municipal corporation

and political subdivision of the State of Utah with its principal
place of business being Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah
(hereinafter "the City").
2.

(Complaint at 5 1, Answer at f 1.)

Appellant, Craig Kirk, is an individual and owner of

property located within Woods Cross City, Utah (hereinafter
"Kirk").
3.

(Complaint at ! 2, Answer at 5 2.)
Kirk owns certain property within Woods Cross located

at approximately 1450 West 500 South (hereinafter "the
Property").

wc-kirk.brf

(Complaint at 5 2, Answer at J 2.)

3

4.

The Property is zoned A-l Agricultural under the Woods

Cross City zoning ordinances,

(Complaint at f 2, Answer at 1 2,

Affidavit of Tim Stephens at 1.)
5.

Kirk is parking and storing large commercial and

industrial trucks and equipment on the Property.

(Affidavit of

Tim Stephens at 2; Affidavit of Dero Gertsch; Affidavit of Leslie
Gertsch; Affidavit of Brent Stephenson; and Affidavit of Gayle
Stephenson.)
6.

The parking and storing of large commercial and

industrial trucks and equipment is not a permitted use of the
Property under the Woods Cross zoning ordinances.

(Complaint;

Affidavit of Tim Stephens at 2.)
7.

The City filed a Complaint against Kirk on August 4,

1992, for his use of the Property in violation of City
ordinances.
8.

(Complaint.)

The City's Complaint requested judgment and permanent

injunction enjoining Kirk from using the Property for commercial
and/or industrial purposes including but not limited to its use
for storing or maintaining commercial vehicles. (Complaint at f

9.

The City's Complaint described the property at issue as

that located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross
City, Utah."
10.

(Complaint at 1 2.)

Kirk's agent, R.L. Hansen of B & C Building Company,

described the Property as that located at "1450 West 500 South"

wc-kirk.brf
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in applying for a building permit from the City to construct a
"barn" on said Property.
11.

(Complaint at 1 4•)

The City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and

Memorandum in Support thereof on December 2,

1992.

(Motion for

Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support.)
12.

Kirk filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Dero

Gertsch, Leslie Gertsch, Tim Stephensf Brent Stephenson, and
Gayle Stephenson, which were submitted in support of the City / s
Motion for Summary Judgment, on December 8, 1992.

(Motions to

Strike Affidavits.)
13.

Kirk filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 18, 1992.

(Motion to Dismiss.)
14.
1993.

Kirk filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on January 14,

(Motion to Stay.)
15.

The City / s Motion for Summary Judgment, Kirk's Motion

to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and Motion to Stay
Proceeding were heard before the Honorable S. Mark Johnson on
February 11, 1993, at 10:30 a.m.
by respective counsel.
16.

Both parties were represented

(Judgment at p. 1.)

The City's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and

Kirk's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and
Motion to Stay Proceedings were denied by the Court on March 9,
1993, and Judgment was entered on March 24, 1993 (hereinafter
"the Judgment").
17.

(Judgment at p. 2.)

Kirk filed a Notice of Appeal of the Judgment with the

Utah Court of Appeals on the April 23, 1993.
wc-kirk.brf
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(Notice of Appeal.)

18.

The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Notice of

Appeal from Kirk.

(Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes and Kristi L.

Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition.)
19.

Kirk filed a Docketing Statement with the Utah Court of

Appeals on June 3, 1993.
20.

(Docketing Statement.)

The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Docketing

Statement from Kirk.

(Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes and Kristi

L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition.)
21.

Kirk filed a Statement Regarding Transcript with the

Utah Court of Appeals on July 25f 1993.

(Statement Regarding

Transcript.)
22.

The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Statement

Regarding Transcript from Kirk.

(Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes

and Kristi L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition.)
23.
1993.

Kirk filed an Amended Docketing Statement on August 25,

(Amended Docketing Statement.)
24.

The City did not receive a copy of Kirk's Amended

Docketing Statement from Kirk.

(Affidavits of Michael Z. Hayes

and Kristi L. Hutchings filed with the City's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition.)

wc-kirk.brf
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25.

Kirk filed an Application for Re-Zone of his Property

with the City sometime in November of 1992.
dated October 13, 1992.

The document is

(City's Memorandum in Opposition to

Kirk's Motion to Stay Appeal Proceedings at I 4.)
26.

The Woods Cross City Council denied Kirk's Application

for Re-Zone.

(City's Memorandum in Opposition to Kirk's Motion

to Stay Appeal Proceedings at 1 5.)
27.

Kirk filed an appeal of the City Council's denial of

his Application for Re-Zone with the Second District Court on
March 23, 1993.

(City's Memorandum in Opposition to Kirk's

Motion to Stay Appeal Proceedings at f 6.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in granting the City's Motion
for Summary Judgment against Kirk in that there exist no issues
of material fact and the City is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

The material facts in this case are that Kirk owns

property within Woods Cross City located at approximately 1450
West 500 South; Kirk is using such property to park and store
large commercial trucks and equipment; the property is zoned A-1,
which zone does not permit the parking or storing of large
commercial trucks and equipment.

Injunctive relief for violation

of City zoning ordinances is proper in this case as a matter of
law under Section 12-10-102 of the Woods Cross City Ordinances
and Section 10-9-1002 of the Utah Code Annotated.

wc-kirk.brf
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Kirk failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the
issues raised in his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses and
the trial court was correct in dismissing the same.
Kirk may not raise for the first time on appeal the argument
that he did not have adequate opportunity for discovery prior to
summary judgment.

This argument is meritless anyway and should

not preclude summary judgment in the City's favor.
The trial court did address and rule on Kirk's Motion to
Dismiss, Motion to Strike Affidavits and Motion to Stay
Proceedings.

Kirk's argument that these items were not

entertained by the Court is specious and does not preclude
summary judgment in the City's favor.
Finally, Kirk's appeal is based upon frivolous arguments and
is pursued for purposes of delay and in bad faith.

Pursuant to

Utah R. App. P. 33, the City should be awarded damages, double
costs and attorneys fees incurred as a result of this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CITY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST KIRK AS THERE EXIST
NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

THERE EXIST NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.

The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. Kirk owns
property located at approximately

1450 West 500 South, Woods

Cross, Utah, hereinafter referred to as "the Property."

The

Property is zoned Agricultural A-1 under the Revised Ordinances
of Woods Cross, Utah.

Kirk built a structure on the Property

pursuant to a Building Permit obtained from the City wherein
wc-kirlubrf
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Kirk's agent described the structure as a "barn" and listed the
location of the Property as "1450 West 500 South," Woods Cross.
Kirk is using the Property and the "barn" to park large asphalt
paving trucks and equipment used in his patching and paving
business.
Kirk does not contest the fact that the Property is zoned A1 or that it is being used in violation of the Woods Cross City
zoning ordinances.

Kirk's appeal is based solely on the

contention that Kirk "is not the owner of the property located at
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah . . . " and therefore
has never conducted any business on that property or ever parked
any vehicles on that property.

Appellant's Brief at p. 15.

Kirk's argument is specious, non-meritorious and frivolous.
As the City discussed in its Motion for Summary Disposition,
there is no issue of fact regarding the location of the property
involved in this case.

Kirk owns some property in the area of

1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, which is zoned A-l and
which Kirk is using to park and store large commercial vehicles
and equipment.

No address has been given to the property, so the

parties have been referring to the property as merely that
located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City,
Utah."

Even Kirk used this reference to his property when

applying for a building permit with the City.

Kirk now claims

that the property he owns is "1473 West 500 South, Woods Cross
City, Utah."

This contention is based upon a random assignment

of numbering from Utah Power & Light as noted in Kirk's bill from
wc-kirk.brf
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the Company.

Despite Kirk's argument, only the City can assign

an address to a property (see Affidavit of Scott Anderson
attached to the City's Reply to Kirk's Memorandum in Opposition
to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment).

As testified to in

the Affidavit of Scott Anderson, the Public Works Director of
Woods Cross City, no address has been assigned to the Property.
(Affidavit of Scott Anderson at 1 3.)

Thus, referring to the

Property as that located at "approximately 1450 West 500 South"
is sufficiently clear for purposes of this case.

Regardless, the

Judgment of the Circuit Court does not specifically refer to
"1450 West 500 South" anyway, but merely refers to "property
which is located on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400
West . . . ."

(Judgment at f 1 (March 24, 1993).

Furthermore, the trial court addressed Kirk's "incorrect
address" argument which was raised in both Kirk's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Kirk's Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court found as a matter of

fact that the Property at issue was properly identified.

At the

oral argument before the trial court, Judge Johnson specifically
asked Kirk's attorney if Kirk owned property in the area to which
the pleading referred.
affirmative.

Kirk's attorney answered in the

Judge Johnson further explained that he did not

want there to be any misunderstanding or issue regarding the
property the parties were talking about.

Kirk's attorney agreed,

thereby consenting to the fact that he knows what property the
case involves, that such property is zoned A-l, and that the
wc-kirk.brf
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Property is being used for parking and storing of large
commercial vehicles and equipment.
These conclusions are not disputed by any evidence submitted
by Kirk.

Kirk contends that the Affidavit he filed in opposition

to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment "created a genuine
issue of material fact in this case."

Kirk's Brief at 16. While

it is conceded in Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), that "[o]ne sworn statement
under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual issue,
thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment," the court also
noted that "when the moving party has presented evidence
sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing
party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is
justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present
or would be at trial."
omitted).

Arnica, 768 P.2d at 953 (citation

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that

affidavits in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment must
contain specific evidentiary facts that would be admissible in
evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
v. Treloqqan. 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).*

Treloqqan

Kirk's Affidavit fails

to meet the required standard as it presents no specific evidence
contrary to the facts establishing that Kirk owns property at
approximately 1450 West 500 South which Kirk is using in
1

See also, Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) which states that
"[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to matters stated therein."
wc-kirk.brf
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violation of Woods Cross City zoning ordinances.

Wherefore, the

trial court was justified in concluding that no genuine issue of
fact is present or would be at trial.
Kirk contends that there exists an issue of material fact
regarding the City's allegation that Kirk is using his property
for conducting a business without a license.

Much of this claim

is based upon Kirk's specious argument that he does not own the
property located at 1450 West 500 South in Woods Cross, and
therefore is not responsible for what takes place on such
property.

Kirk's Affidavit merely says that he is not conducting

a business, or storing vehicles or using a phone on property
located at 1450 West 500 South because he does not own such
property.

Kirk's Affidavit does not and cannot say that he has

not built a structure on property located in the vicinity of 1450
West 500 South or that he is not parking and storing large
commercial vehicles.

As noted above, the property referenced in

the pleading notes "approximately 1450 West 500 South in Woods
Cross."

Kirk knows what property this case involves and has

failed to controvert any fact or create an issue of material fact
regarding his use of the Property for conducting a business
without a license and in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning
ordinances.
In addition, regardless of whether there is enough evidence
to support summary judgment on Kirk's use of his property without
a business license, summary judgment is appropriate in this case.
Summary judgment may be granted upon any number of established
wc-kirk.brf
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violations of the Woods Cross City zoning ordinances.

Thus, the

trial court need not have found as a matter of fact or law that
Kirk was conducting business without a license, since it found as
a matter of fact and law that he was parking and storing large
commercial vehicles and equipment on the Property in violation of
the zoning ordinances entitling the City to injunctive relief.
B.

THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.

The City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
Woods Cross zoning ordinances provide as a matter of law that
land zoned for Agricultural A-l may be used for:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

agriculture;
single family dwelling;
horticulture;
accessory uses including:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

accessory buildings which are customarily used in
conjunction with f and incidental to, the principal
use or structure;
swimming pools;
home occupations;
household pets;
storage of materials used for construction of a
building;

Section 12-10-102 of the Revised Ordinances of Woods Cross, Utah,
1992.

Kirk , s use of the Property to park and store paving trucks

and equipment is use of the Property for industrial and/or
commercial

purposes.

Such use is not permitted

under Section

12-

10-102, and is therefore in violation of the Woods Cross zoning
ordinances as a matter of law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002
(1992), the City is entitled to obtain an injunction prohibiting
Kirk's further industrial and/or commercial use of the Property.
wc-kirlubrf
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Furthermore, the City "need only establish the violation [of the
ordinance] to obtain the injunction."
1002(1)(b) (1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-

A specific showing of irreparable injury is

not required in an action by the City to enjoin a violation of
its zoning ordinances as "a showing that the zoning ordinance has
been violated is tantamount to a showing of irreparable injury .
. . ."

Utah County v. Baxter. 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981).

specific showing of damages is also not required.
Sprinoville City, 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984).

A

Harris v.

Under the applicable

laws, ordinances and undisputed facts, the City is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law and the trial court's finding
should be affirmed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING THE CITY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE DISMISSAL OF
KIRK'S COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.

Kirk has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies
regarding the issues raised in his Counterclaim and affirmative
defenses and therefore the trial court properly granted the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding such claims.

It is

well-established law that failure to exhaust administrative
remedies prevents one from seeking relief from the courts.
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983).
The Utah Supreme Court noted in Merrihew:

" [w]e do not reach the

issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance because we hold
that the Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prevents him from seeking relief at this time from the courts."
wc-kirk.brf
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Merrihew, 659 P.2d at 1067. The Utah Legislature has also
recognized the importance of exhausting administrative remedies
in the area of local land use and planning.

Section 10-9-1001(1)

of the Utah Code Annotated provides:
No person may challenge in district court a
municipality's land use decisions made under this
chapter or under the regulation made under authority of
this chapter until that person has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1) (1992).
In essence, Kirk's Counterclaim and affirmative defenses
request the court to re-zone the Property from A-l to 1-1 or to
grant a non-conforming use permit to allow Kirk to use the
Property to store and park large commercial vehicles and
equipment.

It would have been improper for the trial court to

entertain such a request as there exists administrative
procedures and remedies for Kirk to exhaust prior to raising such
claims before the court.

Under Woods Cross City ordinances and

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, et seq., Kirk should have filed an
application for re-zone or for a non-conforming use permit with
the City Planning Commission setting forth all the reasons why
the Property should be re-zoned.

The decision of the Planning

Commission, if adverse to Kirk, could then be appealed to the
City Council.

The City Council's decision, if adverse to Kirk

could then be appealed to the District Court.

Utah Code Ann. §

10-9-1001 (1992).
Subsequent to this action by the City against Kirk, Kirk
filed an application for re-zone of his Property from A-l to 1-1
wc-kirk.brf
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with the City Planning Commission.

The City Council ultimately

denied Kirk's re-zone request and Kirk filed an appeal of that
decision with the Second District Court.

The appeal to the

Second District Court is in its discovery stage.

The application

for re-zone and appeal in the Second District Court is the
correct procedure for determining the issues raised in Kirk's
Counterclaim.

They should not be entertained by this Court in

conjunction with the present case regarding Kirk's violations of
existing Woods Cross zoning ordinances.
If Kirk's argument is taken to its logical extreme, any
person could entirely circumvent the City's re-zone and permit
application process.

Under Kirk's argument, rather than

requesting a property re-zone or conditional use permit from the
local government, a property owner could simply use his or her
property in violation of local ordinances, and when the local
government brought an action for violation of its ordinances, the
property owner could counterclaim asking the court to re-zone the
property.

This is not allowed, however, as the Utah Legislature

has specifically delegated land use and zoning decisions to local
authorities not the courts.

In addition, the administrative

remedies of the local jurisdiction must be exhausted prior to
seeking relief from the courts.
(1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1)

Kirk's argument also incorrectly implies that a person

may violate current city ordinances if an application for re-zone
has been filed with the city or if a challenge has been made to
the applicable ordinance.
wc-kirk.brf

Once again, this is not the case as
]^g

property owners must comply with current law until and unless
otherwise permitted by re-zone, conditional use permit or
judicial determination.
Kirk's use of his Property in violation of the Woods Cross
zoning ordinances is not exempted simply because he has filed for
a re-zone with the City.

Nor is it for this Court or the trial

court to determine whether such re-zone should be granted, absent
exhaustion of administrative remedies already provided by state
and local law.2

Finally, despite Kirk's argument, an "attempt"

to exhaust administrative remedies is not sufficient to qualify
as exhaustion of administrative remedies.
III. THE NEW ISSUES PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
DO NOT JUSTIFY OVERTURNING THE TRIAL COURT7S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE CITY'S FAVOR.
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROHIBITED IN THIS CASE BY
KIRK'S ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY
TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY.

Summary Judgment in the City's favor should not be
overturned on the grounds that Kirk did not have adequate
opportunity to conduct discovery.
for the first time on appeal.

First, Kirk raises this issue

It is well-established law that

issues not raised below may not be addressed for the first time

2

See Provo City v. Claudin, 63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936),
discussed in the City's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 11, wherein the
Utah Supreme Court declined to hear the Claudin's substantive
argument regarding the constitutionality of Provo's zoning
ordinance as applied to the Claudin's since the Claudin's had
failed to first exhaust administrative remedies provided under
Provo ordinances.
wc-kirk.brf
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on appeal.

Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah 1993).

In

Smith, the Utah Supreme Court declined to consider an argument
which was not adequately framed in the pleadings nor adequately
raised in the summary judgment motion or supporting memorandum,
and noted "it is fundamental that the trial court should have the
first opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal."
Smith. 848 P.2d at 677 (citations omitted).

Furthermore, Rule

56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment may submit an affidavit
stating the reasons why he or she needs more opportunity for
discovery prior to entry of summary judgment.
56(f).

Utah R. Civ. P.

Kirk failed to raise the issue of "adequate discovery" in

his Memorandum in Opposition to the City,s Motion for Summary
Judgment, at oral argument before the trial court, under a Rule
56(f) Motion, or in any other pleadings submitted to the Court.
The issue may not now be raised or considered by the Court for
the first time on appeal.
In addition to improper timing, Kirk's "lack of adequate
discovery" argument is meritless. While it is true that summary
judgment may not be appropriate if discovery is incomplete, the
parties and the court need not go on a fishing expedition for
purely speculative or irrelevant facts. Downtown Athletic Club
v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

As noted in

Downtown Athletic, "a court should deny a motion to continue if
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without
merit."
wc~ki.rk.brf

Downtown Athletics, 740 P.2d at 276.
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In the case at

hand, the material facts have been properly established, they are
not in dispute, and the City is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law based on such facts. Further discovery in this case would
not add anything to these material facts, and would only be
dilatory or without merit.

Thus, summary judgment in the City's

favor is proper.
B.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROHIBITED IN THIS CASE BY
KIRK'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
RULE ON KIRK'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVITS.

Summary Judgment in the City's favor should not be
overturned on the grounds that the trial court failed to rule on
Kirk's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Affidavits.

Of all

of Kirk's arguments, this is perhaps the most ridiculous.

Both

parties fully addressed these motions through Memorandum
submitted in support and opposition of the same as well as at
oral argument.

More importantly, the trial court addressed these

arguments and ruled on them in conjunction with granting the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
1993, states on page 1:

The Judgment dated March 24,

"Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits,
and Motions to Stay Proceedings came on before the Honorable S.
Mark Johnson on Thursday, the 11th day of February 1993 . . . ."
The Judgment then ordered, adjudged and decreed that "Defendant's
counterclaim in its entirety is dismissed" and "Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike Affidavits, and Motion to
Stay Proceedings are denied."
wc-kirk.brf

Judgment at If 4 & 5 (March 24,
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1993).

Thus, there is no merit to Kirk's argument that these

Motions need to be heard when in fact they have already been
heard and adjudicated upon by the trial court.
IV.

THE CITY SHOULD BE GRANTED DAMAGES, COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AND PURSUED SOLELY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DELAY.

Kirk's appeal in this case is not only non-meritorious, but
also frivolous and in bad faith.

Pursuant to the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, the City is entitled to just damages, double
costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred as a result of such
frivolous appeal.

Rule 33 provides:

If the court shall determine that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages and single or double costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party.
Utah R. App. P. 33.
A frivolous appeal has been defined as "[o]ne in which no
justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily
recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect
that it can ever succeed."

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415

(Utah 1990) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th ed. 1979)).
Rule 33, as amended in 1990, also provides that for purposes of
the Appellate Rules, "a frivolous appeal . . . is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law. M

wc-kirk.brf
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Kirk's appeal is frivolous under both these standards as it
is based solely on the argument of a wrong address.

Kirk claims

he does not own property located at 1450 West 500 South in Woods
Cross, and therefore is not responsible or liable for any
wrongdoing on such property.

However, the Judgment does not

refer specifically to the Property as located at 1450 West 500
South, but describes the Property owned by Kirk in that general
area.

More importantly, the parties know the property this case

involves.3

To argue otherwise is in bad faith.

Finally, Kirk's

pursuit of this appeal is mainly a delay tactic in order to
permit Kirk to continue to violate the ordinances of Woods Cross.
Since Kirk's Motion to Stay the injunction was granted, Kirk is
using the Property in violation of the Woods Cross zoning
ordinances and the City has no way to prevent such use pending
this appeal.

It is therefore in Kirk's best interest to continue

the judicial process regardless of its merit in order to avoid
enforcement of the injunction preventing Kirk's improper use of
the Property.
In awarding damages under this Rule, the Supreme Court noted
in Hunt, that "[w]e do not believe or intend that the litigation
of new or uncertain issues will be chilled by imposing sanctions
on attorneys who pursue what in reality are nuisance claims and
do so in an unlawyer-like fashion by writing an unprofessional

3

As previously discussed, the trial judge specifically
questioned Kirk's attorney about this issue at the oral argument
held on February 11, 1993. It was conceded at that time that the
parties understood the property involved in the case.
wc-kirk,brf
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brief and relying on improper materials and arguments in the
brief."

Hunt, 785 P.2d at 415.

In the case at hand, Kirk's

filing and notice practice (i.e. failure to send opposing counsel
a copy of any pleading filed with the Court of Appeals except the
Brief, which was itself seven days late), and the frivolous basis
for its appeal, fall squarely within the sanctions permitted
under Rule 33. Wherefore, the City respectfully requests this
Court for just damages, double costs and attorney's fees incurred
by the City in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in
a light most favorable to Kirk, it is clear that there exists no
issue of material fact regarding the location of the property at
issue in this case, that such property is zoned A-l under the
Woods Cross Ordinances and that Kirk is parking and storing large
commercial vehicles and equipment on such Property.
The major purpose of summary judgment is "to avoid
unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings
to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present the fact
finder."

Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d

776 (Utah 1984).

In circumstances where the grant is justified,

it serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble
and expense of trial which would be to no avail anyway.
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1980).

McBride

The trial court

correctly determined that a trial would be to no avail in this
wc-kirk.brf
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case and properly granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment
thereby serving the salutary purpose of eliminating any
unnecessary time, trouble and expense to the parties and the
courts.
The City respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
judgment of the trial court dated March 24, 1993, granting the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Kirk's
Counterclaim and Motions.

The City further requests an award of

damages, costs and attorney's fees the Court deems appropriate
for defense of this frivolous appeal.
DATED this

day of June, 1994.

Kisa G. Romney
^ ^
Attorney for Plaintiff

wc-kirk.brf
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

day of Junef 1994,

two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was mailed first class mail, postage prepaid to the
following:

Charles A. Schultz
P.O. Box 1516
Sandy, Utah 84103

fl^+\j&*
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EXHIBIT "A"

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES:
Woods Cross Ordinance § 12-10-101
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1992)
Utah R. Civ. P. 56
Utah R. App. P. 33

wc-kirk.brf
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CHAPTER 12-10

AGRICULTURE ZONE A-l

12-10-101
12-10-102
12-10-103
12-10-104
12-10-105
12-10-106
12-10-107
12-10-108
12-10-109

Purpose
Permitted Uses
Conditional Uses
Minimum Lot Standards
Maximum Building Height
Off-street Parking, Loading, and Access
Signs
Site Plan Review
Fencing

12-10-101

Purpose

The Agriculture Zone A-l is established to provide areas in
which agricultural pursuits can be encouraged and supported within
Woods Cross • The A-l Zone is designed and intended to protect
agriculture uses from encroachment of urban development until such
time as residential, commercial, or industrial uses in such areas
become necessary and desirable. Conversion of the agriculture zone
to zones allowing urban uses should be accomplished in an orderly
and progressive manner with no "leap frog" encroachments of such
uses or development into agriculture areas.
12-10-102

Permitted Uses

(A)

Agriculture

(B)

Single Family Dwelling

(C)

Horticulture

(D)

Accessory Uses:
Accessory uses and structures are permitted in the A-l
Zone, provided they are incidental to, and do not
substantially alter the character of, the permitted
principal use or structure.
Such permitted accessory
uses include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1)

Accessory buildings such as garages, carports,
bathhouses, greenhouses, gardening sheds, barns,
recreation rooms, and similar structures which are
customarily
used
in
conjunction
with,
and
incidental to, the principal use or structure.

(2)

Swimming Pools

(3)

Home Occupations subject
Chapter 27 of this Title.

(4)

Household Pets
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to

the

regulations

of

(5)

12-10-103

Storage of Material used for construction of a
building, including contractors temporary office,
provided that such use is on the building site or
immediately adjacent thereto, and provided further
that such use will be permitted only while
construction is actually in progress and 30 days
thereafter,
Conditional Uses

(A)

Public Uses

(B)

Quasi-Public Uses

(C)

Grazing and Pasturing

(D)

Agricultural Industry

12-10-104

Minimum Lot Standards

All lots shall be developed and all structures and uses shall
be placed in accordance with the following minimum standards:

(A)

Lot Size:

1 acre

(B)

Lot Width:

100 feet

(C)

Front & Rear Yard:

30 feet

(D)

Side Yard:

8
feet
id a total width of
the two required side yards of
18 feet; main buildings only.

(E)

Side Yard Corner:

20 feet for all buildings on
the
side
adjacent
to
the
street.

(F)

Accessory Buildings:

Accessory Building shall be 6
feet or more in the rear of the
main building and at least 1
foot from all property lines;
and shall be 15 feet from
dwellings on adjacent lots.
(Accessory buildings shall not
be built over utility easements
that may run along side and
rear property lines.)
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MUNICIPAL LAND USE

10-9-1002

energy devices based on renewable resources from being installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 52.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992

PART 10
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT
10-9-1001. AppealsCD No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative
remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision
with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, made grammatical changes in Subsection (1)

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and
Planning § 1019 et seq

10-9-1002.

C.J.S. — 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning § 265 et seq

Enforcement.

(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality
in which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to
other remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction.
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding building permits.
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without
approval of a building permit.
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10-9-1003

CITIES AND TOWNS

(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans
of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,
or use fully conform to all regulations then in effect.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1002, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 54.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Laches as defense in suit by governmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73
A.L.R.4th 870.

10-9-1003.

Penalties.

(1) The municipal legislative body may, by ordinance, establish civil penalties for violations of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances
adopted under the authority of this chapter.
(2) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of any ordinances
adopted under the authority of this chapter are punishable as a class C misdemeanor upon conviction either:
(a) as a class C misdemeanor; or
(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted under the authority of this section.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1003, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 55; 1992, ch. 23, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added Subsection
(1), designated Subsection (2), and added "either" to precede new Subsections (2)(a) and
(2Kb).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235,
§ 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

CHAPTER 10
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS
(Repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 24, § 2; 1977, ch.
48, § 1; 1979, ch. 31, § 1;
1988, ch. 169, § 66.)

10-10-1 to 10-10-75.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 169, § 66 repeals vice commission, were repealed by § 10-1-114,
§ 10-10-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 48, § 1. For present
to division of city into wards, effective April 25, provisions, see § 10-3-1001 et seq.
1988.
Sections 10-10-23 to 10-10-75 (L. 1961, ch.
Sections 10-10-2 to 10-10-8 (Utah Code An- 24, § 1; 1967, ch. 24, § 1; 1971, ch. 14, § 1;
notated 1953; L. 1957, ch. 20, § 1), relating to 1 9 7 2 ( i s t S.S.), ch. 1, §§ 1 to 12; 1973 (1st S.S.),
budget system, were repealed by Laws 1961, c h 1? § 1)f t h e U n i f o r m Mumcipal Fiscal Prod i - 2 4 ! ^ * „^ n
.^ ,^ rtrt ,TT , ^ , *
cedures Act, were repealed by Laws 1979, ch.
Sections 10-10-9 to 10-10-22 (Utah Code An- Q1 R , Vnr.'cor,f
JZM*
0 ^ &s m Aim
4. 4. j i n c o T mco v. on * i mnc u ic
31, § 1. ror present provisions, see §§ 10-6-101
notated 1953; L. 1953, ch. 20, § 1; 1955, ch. 16, . 10-6-159
§ 1; 1955, ch. 17, § 1), relating to the civil ser-562

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977)
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
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from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment,
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
C i t e d m U t a h S a n d & G r a v e l ods
^ - CorP v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965),
J P W
' E n t e r s > I n c v- N a e f ' 6 0 4 R 2 d 4 8 6
< U t a h 1979 >; K a t z v P i e r c e > 7 3 2 P 2 d 9 2 < U t a h
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
F
, f U r f to P™ «**«* ° f ^ c a t i o n for def
ault
required only
[ c u sJt ^ ^ f^™™^"
^
°m, 28 A.L.K.dd ISM.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set

149

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56

forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes.
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

This rule is similar to

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.

Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Notice.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Guardianship.
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Recovery for goods and services.
—Stock ownership.
—Wrongful possession.
Summary judgment proper.
—Contract action.
—Contract terms.
—Deceit.
—Jurisdiction.
—Negligence.
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Rule 3 3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Enckson, 802 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 941.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 995.
Ar n
T^x.r
i_ • i_ • *
^
J
A L.R. - Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
A.L.R.3d 1221.
Right to interest, pending appeal, of judg-

ment creditor appealing unsuccessfully on
grounds of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411.
Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
^
tlve
h c a t l o n a n d effect of state
statute or m l e allowing mtere8t or c h a n g i n g

judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694
Key Numbers. — Interest «= 39(2).

rate of interest on

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court

must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
However, the amount of damages — single or
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended

